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Abstract
Current e-commerce practice enforces a customer to disclose his/her identify to the e-shop. The use of credit cards
makes it straightforward for an e-shop to know the real identity of its customers. Although there are some payment
systems based on untraceable tokens, they are not as widely used as credit cards. Furthermore, even without buying
anything, a customer is already disclosing some information about who he or she may be or where he or she is by just
connecting to the e-shop’s Web server and leaving behind an IP address. The Pseudonymity System described in this
document is a simple and effective way of buying goods over the Internet without having to reveal the sutomer’s real
identity.
1 Introduction
One major goal of the IST ShopAware project is to build
trust in electronic commerce to improve its acceptance.
There are several technologies that can help to achieve
this, e.g. by encrypting all communication between cus-
tomer and merchant. Traditional stores offer a certain de-
gree of anonymity in the sense that the customer does
not have to give away his identity if he pays with cash.
It is therefore desirable that online shopping offers this
anonymity as well. On the other hand, anonymity may
seem at odds with other security requirements such as au-
thentication.
Generally, the process of buying electronic goods con-
sists of three parts: (i) a customer (Bob) browses through
the e-shop, looks at information about products, chooses
the ones he wants, and fills them in his shopping cart; (ii)
he proceeds to the checkout and provides a credit card,
which is checked by the e-shop; (iii) after Bob’s credit is
cleared out, he has access to the products he has paid for.
Traditionally, none of these parts is anonymous. When
browsing through the e-shop, IP-packets are sent from the
customer’s machine to the e-shop and vice versa. These
packets contain the sender and receiver’s IP-addresses.
An eavesdropper or the e-shop can easily derive from
those packets Bob’s identity or at least the name of the
computer he is using. When Bob has to submit his credit
card, he discloses even more of his identity.
An anonymous record or transaction (Clarke, 1999) is
one whose data cannot be associated with a particular in-
dividual, either from the data itself or by combining the
transaction with other data. Examples for anonymous
transactions are casting a vote in a ballot or a cash pay-
ment. A pseudonymous record or transaction (Clarke,
1999) is one that is identified by a pseudonym and the
transaction cannot, in the normal course of events, be as-
sociated with a particular individual. This means that a
transaction is pseudonymous in relation to a particular
party if the transaction data contains no direct identifier
for that party. But if a specific piece of additional data
is available, then the transaction data can be linked to that
party1. To be effective, a pseudonymous mechanism must
involve legal and technical protections, such that the link
can only be made (i.e. the index can only be accessed)
under certain circumstances.
In the context of business in general, and e-business in
particular, anonymity may lead to fraud. Pseudonymity is
therefore a requirement for a trusted platform.
The Pseudonymity System consists of three parts: the
Pseudonymity Network, the Pseudonymity Certification
Authorities, which issue pseudonyms (Pseudonymous
Certificates), and the Pseudonymous Transactions, which
allows payment with pseudonymous credit cards.
The Pseudonymity Network (PN) enables browsing the
Internet anonymously. It is not bound to e-commerce, but
can be used for any browsing-activity in the Internet. It is
1This piece of additional data could be an entry in an index that maps
a party to its pseudonym.
based on a set of distributed proxies that are operated by
independent institutions. It enables Web users to browse
the Web such that neither the Web server (or e-commerce
site) nor any eavesdropper nor the independent operators
of the proxies can find out where those users are, who they
are, and where they are going.
We also provide customers with pseudonymous cer-
tificates, which are certificates not for their real iden-
tity but for self-chosen pseudonyms. On one hand,
pseudonymous certificates enable customers to authen-
ticate themselves as their pseudonym, but on the other
hand, e-shops cannot derive the customers’ real identi-
ties. The Pseudonymity Certification Authority (PCA),
which has issued the certificate, is the only instance that
knows the link between the real identity of a customer
and her pseudonymous. This is needed to resolve the
pseudonymity in the case the owner of a pseudonym tries
to misuse the pseudonymous certificate in order to cheat.
Revealing the real identity could be requested by a court
order, for example.
Finally, our system is completed with the
Pseudonymity Transaction. Credit cards are very
popular in e-commerce and this is not likely to change
very soon. We therefore want to provide credit cards
for pseudonymous users. The idea is that there could
be financial institutions (Pseudonymity Credit Card
Providers (PCCP)) that would not require users to reveal
their real identity to obtain a pseudonymous credit card.
A pseudonymous certificate is needed to issue a credit
card for that pseudonym. This is perfectly secure since
the chain of PCAs described above can, if required,
reveal the real identity of the pseudonymous user.
In the remaining of the paper, we define the require-
ments for anonymous e-commerce in section 2. We
present our proposal to solve the anonymity problem us-
ing pseudonymous identities (section 3). Afterwards, the
anonymity properties of the solution are analysed (sec-
tion 4). We present the systems limitations in section 5.
We describe other works done on the area of anonymity
and pseudonymity in section 6. Section 7 gives an insight
of the current status of development of the Pseudonymity
System and discusses future work. Finally, we conclude
our work in section 8.
2 Pseudonymity Requirements
A connection between two parties is anonymous with re-
gard to a third instance if it is not possible for that instance
to unveil more than one of the communicating parties.
Note that a connection is still anonymous if one of the par-
ties is detected. To make the term connection anonymity
even stronger, we say that it should not be possible to de-
termine any information about more than one of the com-
municating parties. By any information, we mean infor-
mation that does not necessarily uncover a party’s iden-
tity but that gives hints to identify the party. Connection
anonymity can be achieved by disguising the communi-
cation path.
We should also consider data confidentiality. Even
though an instance breaks the connection anonymity be-
tween two parties, the attacker should not be able to read
any content of the exchanged data. We refer to this case
as data confidentiality with regard to a certain instance.
Another term is data anonymity. Data anonymity
means that the data in messages should not enable any-
one to determine the identities of the communicating par-
ties. Not even the two parties involved in the communi-
cation. This means hat Bob must not include any infor-
mation about himself in the messages sent to Alice, since
Alice could otherwise determine Bob’s identity.
Therefore, anonymous electronic commerce should
fulfil the following requirements:
Definition 1 The e-shop should not be able to identify the
customer’s real identity.
Definition 2 It should not be possible to derive the
sender’s real IP-address from the source IP-address in
messages sent to the e-shop.
Definition 3 When paying with a credit card, the e-shop
should not be able to acquire knowledge about the cus-
tomer’s real identity from the credit card information pro-
vided.
Definition 4 On the other hand, the merchant should
have the same guarantees about the validity of the credit
card information as in non-anonymous payments.
Definition 5 The credit card provider should not be able
to link the payment from a customer to an e-shop.
In the next sections, we describe our Pseudonymous
System that can achieves every and all of these require-
ments.
3 The Pseudonymity Service
The Pseudonymity Service is composed by third-party
service providers and, as such, requires trust. The ques-
tion is how much trust a customer is willing to have in a
third-party service. One could argue that there is a single
instance that offers an anonymity service for a customer to
communicate with another party such that nobody besides
the customer and the third-party is able to learn about the
end-to-end connection (see Anonymizer (Cottrell, 1997)).
However, this requires much trust in that single instance
and not every customer may accept that
At least two entities should be in the middle of any
pseudonymous communication: one closer to the client
and the other closer to the server. We refer to these enti-
ties as Pseudonymity Entities (PE). The PE closer to the
client knows about the client’s location, but does not know
her destination. It only knows the other PE. On the other
hand, the PE closer to the server knows who the server is,
but does not know who is connecting to it since this PE
only sees the PE closer to the client.
The information about the connection client-server is
divided between the PEs, and these entities have to col-
lude to recover the whole path. Each PE knows just a
piece of the entire information. Furthermore, including
more PEs in the chain between client and server can di-
minish the level of trust on every party, but one must
bear in mind that such an increased trust in the system
is achieved at the expense of increased operational over-
head.
This pseudonymous property can be extended to other
aspects of anonymity. Employing at least to PEs when
generating certificates makes it possible to hide the real
identity of a client without losing authentication (Defini-
tion 1). The same argument is valid for payments with
credit cards. Using pseudonymous credit cards makes it
possible to achieve anonymity requirements 3, 4 and 5.
Our Pseudonymity System consists of three distinct
parts: the Pseudonymity Certification Authorities, which
issues Pseudonymous Certificates, the Pseudonymity Net-
work, and the Pseudonymous Transactions, which allows
payment with pseudonymous credit cards. Each of these
parts is composed by two or more PEs.
3.1 Pseudonymity Certification Authority
Before Bob can start browsing the Web and buying
goods anonymously, he needs a pseudonym. If Bob sim-
ply wants to surf the Web, then he could choose any
pseudonym. However, such a pseudonym would not help
much when it comes to credit card payments, since no-
body besides Bob could resolve the relation between the
pseudonym and his real identity.
We strongly believe that e-commerce will use strong
user authentication in the future. We therefore have de-
signed a system that provides customers with pseudony-
mous certificates, which are certificates not for their real
identity but for self-chosen pseudonyms. Pseudonymous
certificates enable customers to authenticate themselves
as their pseudonyms, so that e-shops can trust the cus-
tomers without being able to derive the customers’ real
identities.
We introduce the Pseudonymity Certification Authority
(PCA) as an instance that provides trustful pseudonymous
certificates. The certificates are pseudonymous and not
anonymous because the PCA knows the relation between
a customer and her pseudonym. The correctness of the
pseudonym-to-real name mapping can be ensured by, for
example, verifying an electronic certificate endorsing the
customer’s real identity.
The PCA is the only instance that knows the link be-
tween the real identity of a customer and his pseudony-
mous. This is needed to resolve the pseudonymity in
the case the owner of a pseudonym tries to misuse the
pseudonymous certificate in order to cheat. Revealing the
real identity could be requested by a court order, for ex-
ample.
A Pseudonymous Certificate is a standard X.509 cer-
tificate (Housley and Polk, 1999) and is worldwide used
for authentication. Therefore, no interface to e-shops is
required. The only requirement for our certificates to be
used is that the e-shops will have to accept PCAs as valid
Certification Authorities (CA). This means including the
PCA root certificate in the list of valid CAs in the e-shop
database.
An e-shop does not have to have more confidence on
a Pseudonymity Certification Authority than it has on
a standard Certification Authority. The reasoning be-
hind that is that the PCA generates a pseudonymous cer-
tificate based on a real certificate and since an e-shop,
which would accept the real certificate, can thus accept
the pseudonymous certificate. The trust e-shops have on
standard CAs is based on the business model on which
CAs operate. A CA lives of certifying identities, if the
CA starts to issue faked or invalid certificates, its trust-
worthiness would be put in check and it would be out
of business (Friedman et al., 2000). The same assump-
tion can be used for PCAs, if they start mismanaging the
generation of pseudonymous certificates their reliability










Figure 1: Pseudonymity Certification Authority.
A pseudonymous certificate can be used to obtain an-
other pseudonymous certificate at another PCA, creating
a chain of pseudonyms. Each certificate identifies a differ-
ent pseudonym. This way, only all of the involved PCAs
together can resolve the relation between the real identity
and the last pseudonym in the chain. This greatly im-
proves trust of the customers in the system.
For example, in (figure 1), Bob goes to PCA   and re-
quests a pseudonymous certificate for a pseudonym Fred,
and then goes to PCA  and, posing as Fred, requests a
pseudonymous certificate for pseudonym Dan. Bob can
then go to an e-shop and present himself as Dan. The e-
shop accepts the certificate and thinks it is talking to Dan.
The e-shop has no way to correlate Dan with Bob unless
PCA   and PCA  collude with it. On the other hand, if the
e-shop suspects that Dan (Bob) is trying to cheat, then the
e-shop can go to a court of law and present its case. The
court can order PCA   and PCA  to disclose their parts of
the information and reveal that Dan = Fred = Bob, and
thus Bob can be charged properly.
3.2 Pseudonymity Network
As seen in section 2, customers must not send data di-
rectly from their computer to the destination Web site
since this would expose their IP address. At first glance,
this might not be a big problem since most home-
customers today get a temporary IP address assigned by
their Internet Service Provider, which means that deriv-
ing the customer’s identity from that address is not so
simple (without cooperation from the customer’s ISP, for
instance). On the other hand, deployment of permanent
access technologies (e.g. ADSL) also means that more
and more home-customers will possess a permanent IP
address, which is also the case for many office and univer-
sity computers. Therefore, we want a solution that does
not enable a destination to derive any relevant informa-
tion, such as name, country, IP address, about the cus-
tomer from the IP packet it receives (Definition 1). This
means that the IP packets going from the customer side
to the destination must be relayed by at least one interme-
diate proxy server. If one proxy server is used between
customer and e-shop, then the e-shop’s Web site sees the
proxy’s source address in the received IP packets and has
no way to derive the customer’s IP address (Definition 2).
However, there is an additional problem, namely that
the proxy server knows about the end-to-end connection,
hence there is no connection anonymity with regard to the
proxy. It means that there must be at least two indepen-
dent proxy servers between the customer and the e-shop.
The knowledge is distributed among several proxies such
that no single proxy knows enough to learn about the end-
to-end connection between the communicating parties.
The Pseudonymity Network (PN) is a general mecha-
nism that enables pseudonymous Web browsing. It is not
bound to e-commerce, but can be used for any browsing-
activity on the Internet. It is based on a set of distributed
proxies that can be operated by independent institutions.
It enables customers to browse the Web in a way that nei-
ther the Web server nor eavesdroppers and not even the
proxies’ independent operators can find out where those





Figure 2: Pseudonymity Network.
The PN consists of two or more Pseudonymity Proxies
(PP). The idea is that all communication between the cus-
tomer and the e-shop is relayed by PPs. Figure 2 depicts
a communication between Bob and Alice.
One cannot forget about traffic analysis. Basically, any
of the involved parties (the proxy servers and the e-shop)
or any other party could do traffic analysis to expose the
end-to-end connection. Traffic analysis means that the
eavesdropper monitors the incoming and outgoing links
of a proxy and tries to correlate the packets. If this is done
at all intermediate proxies between customer and e-shop,
it could be possible to find out about the end-to-end con-
nection. Therefore secure channels between every entity
are required.
The secure channels can be established using the
Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol (Diffie and
Hellman, 1976). In the DH protocol, both parties involved
in the key exchange contribute to generate a shared secret
key, which is then used to encrypt the communication be-
tween the parties.
Figure 3 shows how the channels are nested in order to
protect the end-to-end connection anonymity:
1 Bob establishes a secure channel C   with
Pseudonymity Proxy 1 (PP   ) and they share
key k   . Bob then issues a request to PP   to connect
to PP  ;
2 Bob establishes a secure channel C  , on top of C   ,
with PP  , using PP   as a proxy. Bob shares k  with
PP  . Note that PP   and PP  already have a secure
channel LC   between them and hence share key kl   ;
3 Bob issues a request to PP  , which cannot be seen by
PP   because it is encrypted with k  (C  ), to connect
to Alice;
4 Eventually, Bob decides to buy something from Al-
ice and wants to pay for it; Bob establishes a secure
channel (C   ) to Alice (on top of C   and C  ), and
starts the payment process (see section 3.3). Bob and















Figure 3: Layers of encryption.
Access to the PN is accomplished through a local proxy
(LP), which runs on Bob’s machine (or Bob’s LAN) and
appears as a normal Web proxy to the browser.
the PN is therefore transparent to the browser, and hence
does not require any modifications.
Figure 3 shows Bob’s LP, two PPs and Alice. There
are two nested channels, one between LP and PP  and one
between LP and Alice. When Bob sends data to Alice, his
LP encrypts this data first with the key k  , which he shares
with Alice, then with the key k  , he shares with PP  , and
then encrypts this with k   , shared with PP   . When PP  
receives the data from Bob’s LP, it decrypts the data with
k   , encrypts it with kl   and forwards the data to PP  . PP 
on its turn decrypts the data first with kl   , then with k  and
then forwards the data to Alice. Finally, Alice decrypts
the data with k  and recovers the original message. The
response from Alice follows the inverse path to Bob.
The result is that each of the three entities sees dif-
ferent data after removing the link encryption: PP   sees
[[data]   ]   ; PP  sees [data]   ; and Alice sees the plain-
text data. An external eavesdropper sees [[[data]   ]   ]  
between LP and PP   , [[[data]   ]   ]   between PP   and
PP  , and [data]    between PP  and Alice. Since the data
is differently encrypted between each pair of entities, the
eavesdropper cannot correlate them.
Furthermore, authentication plays an important role in
the Pseudonymity Network. In order to avoid unautho-
rised Pseudonymity Proxies to join the PN, the secure
channels between PPs are double authenticated. PP  and
PP 
	   exchange certificates to prove to each other that
they are who they claim to be. With double authentica-
tion we can guarantee that no malicious outsider can pose
as a valid PP and join the PN.
Our PN implementation uses Secure Socket Layer
(SSL) (Freier et al., 1997; Dierks and Allen, 1999) to per-
form the authenticated DH. Furthermore, the secure con-
nection between Bob and PP  will be performed by a lo-
cal proxy running on Bob’s machine. After the channel is
established, the local proxy gives it to Bob’s browser and
then Bob can access Alice’s Web pages in the same way
he would do without the PN.
The network of proxies hides the location of customers
without limiting their access to online shops. The reason
for that is PN does not need a special gateway to inter-
face with e-shops, it uses only standard protocols, such
as HTTP and SSL, to connect and talk to the online shop
on behalf of customers. Thus, e-commerce Web sites do
not require any technical modifications in order to accept
connections from PN users.
3.2.1 Considerations
One can look at the PN and get to the conclusion that it is
not a pseudonymity network; it is rather an anonymity
network. We argue that we provide a certain level of
anonymity throught a pseudonymous system. PN users
are anonymous from the point of view of outsiders (since
ousiders are not able to link origin-destination in a con-
nection), but it is also pseudonymous because our proxies
can make the link.
Accordingly to Clarke’s definition, no matter how hard
one tries, it can never be possible to trace back an anony-
mous transaction, and this holds true irrespective of how
much information one has access to (note that this extra
information can come from anywhere). Furthermore, “a
pseudonymous record or transaction is one that cannot, in
the normal course of events, be associated with a partic-
ular individual” and we go on saying that a transaction
is pseudonymous if its data does not contain anything to
link it to an individual, but that with additional info, that
the transaction and the individual could be linked.
Note that a “transaction” on the network will usually
involve two IP addresses: the client’s and the server’s.
Now, PPs simply add a chain of IP addresses in any trans-
action, in a way that nobody, “in the normal course of
events”, knows the entry IP address (the client’s) and the
exit IP address (server’s), and hence providing anonymity.
However, each PP along the line has the opportunity to re-
member its ingress IP addresses (the IP address that con-
nected to its server side) and its egress IP addresses (the
IP address its client side connects to). Whether the prox-
ies choose to remember this information or not by log-
ging it, or even to collude or not, is irrelevant: there is
an opportunity to “resolve” the chain of IP addresses and
therefore link the client’s address with the web server’s
address. The result is always the same: there is an op-
portunity to complete the chain back to the browser’s IP
address, and from there, one may get the user’s identity.
Furthermore, we are trying to provide anonymity for
privacy purposes, not for criminal purposes. If the user is
not doing anything illigal and is just tryng to be unknown,
then she would certainly have no restrictions with the log-
ging. On the other hand, if a malicious-to-be user wants to
use our system for bad-doing then she would think twice
before using our system (she cannot be sure that the logs
will be lost).
Moreover, for a system to be pseudonymous it does not
mean it has to enforce that there must be always a map-
ping between pseudonym and real identity. What we want
to make clear here is that although there is a possibility
of tracing users we do not intend to provide everlasting
traceability.
3.3 Pseudonymous Transaction
Finally, our system is completed with the Pseudonymous
Transaction. Credit cards are very popular in e-commerce
and this is not likely to change very soon. We therefore
want to provide credit cards for pseudonymous customers
(Definition 3). The requirement for such a payment sys-
tem is that the customer should pay with her own credit
card. Of course, she must not pay the e-shop directly but
some pseudonymity entity. From the e-shop’s point-of-
view, it is the PE that pays in behalf of the anonymous
customer. Obviously, PE must not be used alone be-
cause none involved parties are allowed to know every-
thing about the end-to-end connection between the cus-
tomer and the e-shop. This means that there must be at
least two independent PEs between the customer and e-
shop during the payment process.
The idea is that there could be financial institutions,
such as Pseudonymity Credit Card Providers (PCCP), that
would not require customers to reveal their real identity
to obtain a pseudonymous credit card. Just a pseudony-
mous certificate would be required to issue a credit card
for that pseudonym. This is as secure as the verification
of the customer’s real identity by the first PCA in the
pseudonymous certificate chain. As the chain of PCAs
described above can, if required, reveal the real identity of
the pseudonymous customer, for PCAs issuing pseudony-
mous certificates based on other certificates, the system is
therefore as secure as these certificates.
Consider now that a customer goes to a first PCCP,
provides his real identity, his real credit card, and the
first pseudonym in the chain, and then the PCCP issues
a pseudonymous credit card. All purchases made with the
pseudonymous credit card are charged to the real credit
card. The customer can go to a second PCCA, identify
himself with the first pseudonym and his first pseudony-
mous credit card to obtain a pseudonymous credit card for
the second pseudonym. This means that there is again a
chain of PCCP, and only all of them together can break
the pseudonymity.
If the customer goes now to the e-shop and provides
a pseudonymous credit card, then the e-shop accepts it,
because it can be validated as a normal credit card (Def-
inition 4) at the last PCCA in the chain. The credit cards
are validated backwards through the whole chain, which
means that the payment is only approved if the real cus-
tomer and his credit card are credit-worthy. This has the
advantage that there is no financial risk for the PCCPs,
since validation always goes back to the real customer’s















Figure 4: Pseudonymous Transaction.
The pseudonymity is maintained due to the fact that Al-
ice’s bank contacts Dan’s PCCP for clearing the purchase
out. Dan’s PCCP does not know who Dan really is. At
the other end of the chain, Fred’s PCCP contacts Bob’s
CCP for clearing the transaction out, hence Bob’s CCP
believes that the merchant involved in the transaction is
Fred’s PCCP. Also, Fred’s PCCP does not know who the
real merchant is because it has been contacted by Dan’s
PCCP.
A pseudonymous credit card can be accepted as a nor-
mal credit card and, from the e-shop’s point of view, the
authorisation of the pseudonymous credit card transaction
would be done exactly as it is done today with a normal
credit card: through the e-shop’s bank.
3.3.1 Considerations
The most important aspect of a payment process is its
correctness. When a non-anonymous customer purchases
some goods, the risk lies on the customer’s credit card
provider. The e-shop contacts the provider to check if
the credit card is valid and that there is balance available
in that card to cover the requested transaction amount,
i.e. it is checked whether the customer is creditworthy
or not. Based on figure 4, we see that the shop asks
Dan’s PCCP to validate the payment and Dan’s PCCP
asks Fred’s PCCP to validate the payment. Fred’s PCCP
knows Bob and his credit card, hence it contacts Bob’s
CCP to validate the payment. If checking is not success-
fully validated, then none of the other validation requests
will be validated. This implies that if Bob is not credit-
worthy, then Fred’s PCCP, Dan’s PCCP, and Alice will not
accept the payment as valid. Therefore the payment fails.
Note that this is exactly the same as for non-anonymous
customers: if the customer is not creditworthy, the pay-
ment fails.
When Fred’s PCCP is convinced that Bob is creditwor-
thy, it replies to Dan’s PCCP validating Fred’s transac-
tion. Likewise, Dan’s PCCP replies to the Alice’s bank
validating Dan’s transaction. Note that there is no finan-
cial risk for Fred’s PCCP, Dan’s PCCP and Alice. Fred’s
PCCP only validates the request from Dan’s PCCP after it
is convinced that it will receive the money from Bob (via
Bob’s CCP). Dan’s PCCP only validates the request after
it is convinced that it will receive the money from Fred’s
PCCP. Alice only delivers the goods after it is convinced
that she will receive the money from Dan’s PCCP.
4 Analysis
In this section we discuss why a certain customer Bob is
anonymous for all entities in the PS and external eaves-
droppers.
In figure 5, Bob connects to Alice through the PN and
introduces himself to her as Dan. Bob uses Dan’s certifi-
cate he had acquired at PCA  (2). Note that PCA  does
not know that Bob is Dan, PCA  believes that Fred is Dan.
Yet, PCA   , which has issued Fred’s certificate (1), only
knows that Bob is Fred and has no clue that Fred is Dan.
Alice sees Bob’s connection coming from PP  (4),
therefore she does not know where Dan (Bob) is. PP 
also does not know where Bob is, because Bob connected
to PP  via PP   (3). Moreover, PP   does not know where
Bob is browsing, because the destination address that PP  
sees is PP  ’s.
If Bob decides to buy something, he pays using Dan’s
credit card. Alice gets the credit card, but there is no way
for her to link that card to Bob. The authorisation of the
payment is done via Alice’s bank, Dan’s PCCP (7), Fred’s
PCCP (6), and Bob’s CCP (5). Bob is charged by his CCP
via his usual monthly bill (8). The bill contains a transac-





























Bob's CCP Fred's PCCP Dan's PCCP
Figure 5: The Pseudonymity System.
Again, none of the involved parties can learn anything
about the end-to-end connection from Bob to Alice.
Eve (9), who was trying to eavesdrop on Bob’s activi-
ties, does not know Bob’s pseudonyms or where he was
browsing. Bob contacted PCA   and PCA  using secure
channels, hence Eve could not read which Bob’s choices
for his pseudonyms were. When Eve was trying to find
out where Bob was browsing, the only thing she could
see was that Bob was connecting to PP   . Bob contacted
PP   using a secure channel, thus when Bob requested a
connection to PP  , Eve did not see it. When PP  con-
nected to Alice, Eve had no way to know Bob requested
that connection.
Table 1 summarises the required collusions in order to
break the pseudonymity; pseudonymous connection and
data confidentiality. By breaking the pseudonymity we
mean to unveil Bob’s real identity. By pseudonymous
connection, we mean to recover where Bob was when he
used the PN. Finally, by breaking data privacy, we mean
to know what Bob bought from Alice. We conclude that
only the complete set of PPs, PCAs and PCCPs colluding
can break the security of the Pseudonymity System.
Another considerations were given throughout the pa-
per.
5 System Limitations
Although our Pseudonymity System provides reliable
pseudonymous Web browsing, where no single entity has
the total knowledge of the end-points, it suffers from
some limitations. Java applets and java scripts pose as a
serious problem when a secure channel between customer
and merchant is used.
Whilst a customer is browsing using an open channel
(not encrypted), the local proxy can remove HTTP head-
ers and java references from the HTML files. However,
when a secure channel is established between customer
and e-shop (usually during checkout) the local proxy can
no longer filter it. It means that some information about
the customer can leak to the server. For further secu-
rity, the customer should not enable Java applets and java
scripts at least during checkout time.
Furthermore, Felten and Schneider described a tim-
ing attack (Felten and Schneider, 2000) that can be used
against browser caching. The attack is performed with
the attacker measuring the time the target’s browser takes
to fetch a specific resource. If the target has already got-
ten the specific resource, then its browser has it cached
and hence the time to fetch the resource is smaller than to
fetch it over the Internet for the first time. The attacker
can use different techniques to force the target’s browser
to fetch the specific resource. It seems that this kind of
attack can be successful against all known anonymity sys-
tems.
Recently, Yahoo was legally required to prevent French
citizens from accessing auctions of Nazi material. It
seems that French user could easily infringe their law
by using the Pseudonymity Network to access those auc-
tions. Yahoo would not be able to identify French users
using our system. Not even the PS providers would be
able to thwart this situation. Ultimately, Yahoo, or other
concern sites would have to block completely access from
users using such anonymity system.
Finally, our system is initially limited to electronic
goods, such as printable books or digital libraries access.
The reason for that is that for material goods, a delivery
address is required and a system would have to be devised
for assuring customer anonymity. Although, the customer
could have access to an anonymous mailbox where the
purchases could be delivered to, some merchants may not
Table 1: Collusions between Pseudonymity Proxies
(PP   ), Pseudonymity Certification Authorities (PCA   )
and Pseudonymous Credit Card Providers (PCCP  )
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be willing to accept it and require a real address. We can
visualise a solution using a pseudonymous delivery sys-
tem employing a chain of pseudonymity delivery compa-
nies, but the price burden imposed by such solution would
make it prohibitively expensive for customers.
6 Related Work
The Anonymizer (Cottrell, 1997) is a tool for anonymis-
ing Web communications. The Anonymizer is a Web site
that acts as a proxy for Web requests. A user’s request
for an URL is first sent to the Anonymizer, which then
gets the desired Web page from the end server and sends
it back to the user. The Anonymizer is vulnerable to traf-
fic analysis because the data to and from the Anonymizer
are not encrypted.
The Freedom network (ZeroKnowledgeSystems, 2000)
operates by dynamically building anonymous connec-
tions within a network of Anonymous Internet Proxies
(AIPs). During connection setup, the client determines
the path (i.e. which AIPs to use) and generates an ini-
tial packet that contains decryption information (keys) for
each AIP along the way to a destination server. During
data communication, the client sends fixed sized packets
through the network. The packets are first encrypted with
the key of the destination, then this is encrypted with the
key of the last AIP and so on and finally, it is encrypted
with the key of the first AIP. The packet is sent to the first
proxy, which decrypts the packet (i.e. strips off a layer
from the onion) with the key received during setup. Each
AIP along the way strips off the top layer and forwards the
packet until it arrives at the destination. Since one layer
of the onion is stripped off by decryption, incoming and
outgoing packets cannot be correlated. This makes Free-
dom network resistant against traffic analysis. Our PN is
very similar to the Freedom network, but they diverge in
the technology employed. The Freedom network is built
using a homemade protocol that still needs to be proven
safe, while we employ the well-known SSL to create the
secure channels.
A system called Crowds is presented by Reiter (Reiter
and Rubin, 2000). Crowds provides a protocol to retrieve
Web contents anonymously. The protocol works by col-
lecting Web users in a crowd that performs Web trans-
actions on behalf of its members. When a user requests
an URL, this request is forwarded randomly to another
member in the crowd. Whenever a crowd member re-
ceives a request from another member, it makes a ran-
dom choice to either forward the request to another crowd
member (chosen randomly) or submit this request to the
end server to which the request was destined. The re-
ply from the server uses the same way back. If he crowd
is large enough, then neither the other members nor the
server nor any eavesdropper outside the crowd can tell
which member in the crowd initiated the request and the
system provides anonymity in the sense that any crowd
member could have requested the Web page. The system
has its weaknesses against local eavesdroppers (that mon-
itor the traffic within the crowd) and collaborating mem-
bers.
The Lucent Personalized Web Assistant (LPWA) (Gab-
ber et al., 1997) provides its users aliases where each alias
consists of an alias username, alias password and alias
e-mail address. The LPWA acts as a proxy and when-
ever the user has to submit username, password or the
e-mail address, he uses predefined two character escape
sequences (  u,  p or  ), and LPWA replaces them with
the appropriate alias. The advantage of LPWA is that it
provides the user a simple and effective way to generate
and use pseudonyms.
7 Current Status and Future Work
We have implemented the Pseudonymity Certification
Authority server and two of them are running at the mo-
ment for demonstration purposes: one at Lancaster and
the other at ETH. Users owing a Verisign certificate can
request a pseudonymous certificate from both sites. The
prototype has been developed using OpenSSL (OpenSSL-
ProjectTeam, 1999) on Linux platform.
We finished designing the Pseudonymity Network
(there is a technical report (Rennhard et al., 2001) de-
scribing the architecture) and started implementing the
Pseudonymity Proxies. By the time this paper is pub-
lished we should have them up and running. We plan to
have a PP running at Lancaster and another at ETH. After
they have been installed on both sites, we plan to start a
thorough testing of performance and shortly after that to
make the network available for users worldwide.
The PP’s implementation is being done in Java. We de-
cline the performance of the application on behalf of fast
development and portability. We understand that rewrit-
ing the application in a more efficient language, such as
C, will be just a matter of time once we have finished our
tests.
By the middle of 2001, we should have a working
demo of the system, which will include also pseudony-
mous transactions using pseudonymous credit cards.
8 Conclusions
We have presented an architecture aimed at improv-
ing trust in e-commerce systems. Based on the use
of a Pseudonymity Service, we have shown a solution
for providing an e-commerce experience emulating the
“anonymity” that can be achieved in traditional shops.
Our system provides pseudonymous credit card payment,
and does not require any modification to the browsers,
server base and financial networks. A simple interface to
the pseudonymous system that will allow material goods
delivery, although not discussed here, is also being con-
sidered.
The Pseudonymity Service gives to a real user a
pseudonymous identity that can be used consistently in
the Internet and therefore allow e-commerce sites to per-
form important customer management functions. Our so-
lution is suitable for e-commerce, but is not restricted
to it. It can be used for any Internet-activity where
pseudonymity is desired.
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